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OPINION 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
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Deborah Hansler requested intermittent leave from her 
former employer, Lehigh Valley Health Network (“Lehigh 
Valley”), under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 
(“FMLA” or the “Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.1 
Specifically, Hansler submitted a medical certification 
requesting leave for two days a week for approximately one 
month. As alleged in the complaint, the medical certification 
refers to the length of her requested leave but not the nature 
or duration of her condition. A few weeks later, after she took 
several days off work, Lehigh Valley terminated Hansler’s 
employment without seeking any clarification about her 
medical certification, as required by law. Lehigh Valley cited 
excessive absences and informed her that the request for leave 
had been denied. Hansler sued Lehigh Valley for violations of 
the Medical Leave Act, and the District Court dismissed the 
complaint on the basis that the medical certification 
supporting Hansler’s request for leave was “invalid.” We 
conclude that, in failing to afford Hansler a chance to cure 
any deficiencies in her medical certification, Lehigh Valley 
violated the Medical Leave Act. Accordingly, we reverse and 
remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
 Hansler was hired by Lehigh Valley in 2011 to work 
as a technical partner. In early March 2013, Hansler began 
experiencing shortness of breath, nausea, and vomiting. At 
the time, the cause of these symptoms was unknown. On 
March 13, Hansler’s physician completed a medical 
                                              
1 The case name incorrectly refers to Lehigh Valley Health 
Network as Lehigh Valley Hospital Network. 
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certification form “requesting intermittent leave at a 
frequency of 2 times weekly starting on March 1, 2013 and 
lasting for a probable duration of one month– or until about 
April 1, 2013.” App. 44. Hansler submitted the certification to 
Lehigh Valley as part of a formal request for leave under the 
Medical Leave Act. As a result of her condition, Hansler was 
unable to work on March 13, 14, 23, 24, and 25. 
 
 Without seeking further information about the medical 
certification from either Hansler or her physician, Lehigh 
Valley terminated Hansler at the end of her shift on March 
28. The basis for Hansler’s termination was absenteeism, 
including the five days she took off in March. Hansler 
reminded Lehigh Valley that she had requested time off under 
the Medical Leave Act, but Lehigh Valley informed her, for 
the first time, that her request had been denied. Following the 
last of her absences, Hansler learned of a letter dated March 
26 explaining that her request for “leave of absence (FMLA) 
for the period of 3/1/13-3/11/13” was denied because her 
“condition presently does not qualify as a serious health 
condition under the criteria set forth by the [Medical Leave 
Act].” App. 45. In early April 2013, after her dismissal, 
Hansler received a diagnosis of diabetes and high blood 
pressure. She alleges that these previously undiagnosed and 
untreated conditions are what caused her March absences. 
 
 Hansler sued Lehigh Valley under the Medical Leave 
Act for interfering with her substantive rights to medical 
leave and for terminating her in retaliation for seeking leave. 
In her complaint, Hansler alleges she has chronic serious 
health conditions and argues that Lehigh Valley improperly 
denied her request for leave without providing her an 
opportunity to cure her medical certification. The District 
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Court granted Lehigh Valley’s motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim. It concluded that Hansler’s request for leave 
was defective because her medical certification indicated that 
her condition would last only one month, but the Medical 
Leave Act requires that a chronic serious health condition 
persist for an “extended period of time.” The District Court 
held that because the certification showed that Hansler was 
not entitled to leave, Lehigh Valley was not required to afford 
Hansler a cure period and was permitted to terminate Hansler 
for her subsequent absences. That Hansler was later 
diagnosed with diabetes and high blood pressure was of no 
consequence. According to the Court, “[a]lthough the timing 
of events for plaintiff was, without question unfortunate, the 
fact remains that her diagnosis with diabetes and high blood 
pressure did not occur until after her leave request was denied 
and she was fired by defendant.” Hansler v. Lehigh Valley 
Health Network, No. 13-cv-03924, 2014 WL 1281132, at *10 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2014). Hansler filed this appeal.2 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 
and we have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s final 
order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Pearson v. Sec’y 
Dep’t of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 2015). To survive 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must 
allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007). A court must accept all factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the plaintiff. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 
231 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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II. 
 
 Congress passed the Medical Leave Act “to balance 
the demands of the workplace with the needs of families” and 
“to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical 
reasons.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b). The Medical Leave Act 
carries out these objectives by providing that eligible 
employees are entitled to 12 workweeks of leave during any 
12-month period if the employee has a “serious health 
condition” that makes the employee unable to perform the 
functions of her position. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D). After a worker 
returns from leave, the worker is entitled to be reinstated to 
her previous position or an equivalent one. Id. § 2614(a)(1). 
 
 A “serious health condition” is one that involves 
inpatient care in a hospital or “continuing treatment by a 
health care provider.” Id. § 2611(11). In its implementing 
regulations, the Department of Labor defines “[c]ontinuing 
treatment by a health care provider” to include “chronic 
serious health condition[s]” that (i) “[r]equire[] periodic visits 
(defined as at least twice a year) for treatment by a health care 
provider,” (ii) “[c]ontinue[] over an extended period of time,” 
and (iii) “[m]ay cause episodic rather than a continuing period 
of incapacity (e.g., asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.).” 29 
C.F.R. § 825.102. 
 
 Prior to taking leave, an employee must give her 
employer notice of the request for leave, “stat[ing] a 
qualifying reason for the needed leave.” Id. §  825.301(b). An 
employer may require its employees to support their requests 
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for leave with a certification issued by a health care provider. 
29 U.S.C. § 2613(a). A “sufficient” medical certification must 
state (1) the date on which the serious health condition began, 
(2) the probable duration of the condition, (3) relevant 
medical facts, (4) a statement that the employee is unable to 
perform the functions of her position, (5) the dates and 
duration of any planned medical treatment, and (6) the 
expected duration of the intermittent leave. Id. § 2613(b). 
 
 Significantly, the Department of Labor’s regulations 
govern how employers are to respond to perceived 
deficiencies in medical certifications. An employer “shall 
advise an employee whenever the employer finds a 
certification incomplete or insufficient, and shall state in 
writing what additional information is necessary to make the 
certification complete and sufficient.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c). 
A certification is “incomplete” if the “employer receives a 
certification, but one or more of the applicable entries have 
not been completed.” Id. A certification is “insufficient” if the 
“employer receives a complete certification, but the 
information provided is vague, ambiguous, or non-
responsive.” Id.  If the employer determines that a 
certification is either incomplete or insufficient, it may deny 
the requested leave on the basis of an inadequate certification. 
But it may only do so if it has “provide[d] the employee with 
seven calendar days (unless not practicable under the 
particular circumstances despite the employee’s diligent good 
faith efforts) to cure any such deficiency.” Id.; see Hansen v. 
Fincantieri Marine Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 
2014) (“[T]he regulations do not authorize the employer to 
deny FMLA leave where the employee fails to provide a 
complete and sufficient certification but is not given the 
opportunity to cure the deficiency.”). 
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A. 
 
 Hansler’s first claim is that Lehigh Valley interfered 
with her rights under the Medical Leave Act by failing to 
afford her a chance to cure deficiencies in her medical 
certification. This claim is based on statutory text providing 
that employers may not “interfere with, restrain, or deny the 
exercise of or attempt to exercise” rights granted under the 
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). Moreover, “[a]ny violations of 
the Act or of these regulations constitute interfering with” the 
exercise of an employee’s rights. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b). To 
assert an interference claim, an employee must establish, 
among other things, that she was denied benefits under the 
Act. Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2014).  
 
 The District Court held that Hansler was not entitled to 
leave or a cure period because her certification was “invalid” 
and “negative on its face.” The Court reasoned that while 
Hansler’s certification requested leave for one month, this 
was not an “extended period of time,” and, therefore, her 
condition did not qualify as a chronic serious health 
condition. In other words, her certification was not merely 
insufficient or incomplete—it demonstrated that she did not 
have a chronic serious health condition. 
 
 Hansler does not argue on appeal that her certification 
established the “extended period of time” requirement, and 
we do not decide that issue here.3 Instead, Hansler maintains 
                                              
3 A chronic serious health condition is one that, among other 
things, “[c]ontinues over an extended period of time.” 29 
 9 
 
she was entitled to the cure period set forth in the regulations 
because the certification was insufficient, rather than negative 
on its face. We agree.4 
 
                                                                                                     
C.F.R. § 825.102. Neither the Act nor the regulations provide 
further clarity as to what “extended period of time” means. 
We have found that a three-year duration for an employee’s 
condition constitutes an extended period of time. See 
Victorelli v. Shadyside Hosp., 128 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 
1997). Other courts have held that chronic illnesses “must 
exist for well more than a few weeks.” Taylor v. Autozoners, 
LLC, 706 F. Supp. 2d 843, 852 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (quoting 
Flanagan v. Keller Prods., Inc., No. 00-542-M, 2002 WL 
313138, at *7 (D.N.H. Feb. 25, 2002)). We will assume here, 
and Hansler does not argue otherwise, that a condition lasting 
for one month does not satisfy the “extended period of time” 
requirement. 
4 Our decision that the certification Hansler’s doctor 
submitted is “insufficient” under 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c) does 
not mean, as the dissent contends, that “you will now be able 
to maintain an interference claim against your employer 
regardless of your condition when you request leave if you 
claim that your diagnosis changed or was not finalized until 
after you submitted the request.” Nor does it mean that the 
“employer who denies a leave request is at risk of an 
interference claim.” It does mean that when a certification 
submitted by an employee is “vague, ambiguous, or non-
responsive,” the employer must,  under 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.305(c), provide the employee an opportunity to cure the 
deficiency within seven days. 
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 The regulations make no reference to negative 
certifications, the basis on which the District Court rejected 
Hansler’s claim. Instead, they provide that whenever an 
employer finds a certification “incomplete” or “insufficient,” 
the employer shall so advise the employee and provide seven 
days to cure the deficiencies. 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c). A 
negative certification is a judicially crafted concept with roots 
in a decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See 
Stoops v. One Call Commc’ns, Inc., 141 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 
1998). In Stoops, the employee’s physician provided a 
medical certification stating that the employee was “not 
presently incapacitated and would not have to work 
intermittently or on a reduced work schedule.” Id. at 311. The 
Seventh Circuit described this as a “negative certification” 
because a serious health condition is one that prevents an 
employee from performing his job, but the employee’s 
physician in Stoops explicitly stated that the employee could 
perform his job functions. Id. at 312-13. “Where an employer 
. . . requests from the employee and receives a physician’s 
certification that indicates that an employee’s serious health 
condition does not require him to miss work, the employer 
may rely on that certification.” Id. at 313. 
 
 Following Stoops, several other Courts of Appeals 
have discussed or alluded to negative certifications. In 
Hoffman v. Professional Med Team, the employee, like the 
one in Stoops, submitted a certification from a physician 
stating she would not need to work intermittently or on a less-
than-full schedule as a result of her condition. Hoffman, 394 
F.3d 414, 416 (6th Cir. 2005). The Sixth Circuit explained 
that, “[t]o be valid, a certification must show that the 
employee’s serious health condition makes her unable to 
perform job functions.” Id. at 419. In Branham v. Gannett 
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Satellite Information Network, Inc., the Sixth Circuit referred 
to a negative certification as one “indicating that [the 
employee] does not have a serious health condition that 
prevents her from performing her job.” 619 F.3d 563, 572 
(6th Cir. 2010). Similarly, the First Circuit found that an 
employer was justified in denying leave where the medical 
certification stated that the employee was “not incapacitated” 
and “disavowed the need for any leave.” Tayag v. Lahey 
Clinic Hosp., Inc., 632 F.3d 788, 793 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 
 We need not decide whether in certain circumstances a 
medical certification may be negative because, even if we 
were to agree with the cases finding negative certifications, 
we still would not find those cases persuasive here. The 
certifications in those cases contained affirmative statements 
from the employees’ physicians that the employees would not 
miss any work, which, by definition, meant they did not have 
“serious health condition[s].” See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). 
Although the First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits appear to 
agree that “employers have no responsibility to conduct 
further investigation when a certification is invalid on its 
face,” the cases discussing negative certifications offer little 
guidance to a court (or employer) confronting an ambiguous 
or non-responsive certification. Hoffman, 394 F.3d at 418-19. 
 
 Hansler’s certification does not contain a statement 
from her physician saying that she would not miss any work. 
Instead, her certification “request[s] intermittent leave at a 
frequency of 2 times weekly . . . and lasting for a probable 
duration of one month.” App. 44. Hansler’s certification is 
“insufficient” under the regulations because it is “vague, 
ambiguous, or non-responsive.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c). As 
we discussed earlier, a sufficient medical certification must 
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state, among other things, both the probable duration of the 
condition and the expected duration of the intermittent leave. 
29 U.S.C. § 2613(b). Hansler’s certification is vague and non-
responsive insofar as it requests intermittent leave for one 
month but fails to specify whether the one month duration 
refers only to the length of her leave request or to the duration 
of her condition.5 As alleged in the complaint, the 
certification seems to refer only to the duration of her leave 
request because the certification does not even mention a 
condition, let alone its duration. See Kauffman v. Fed. 
Express Corp., 426 F.3d 880, 886-87 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(rejecting argument that certification was negative where 
physician omitted the incapacity’s expected duration). In light 
of the mandatory language in the regulations instructing 
employers to advise their employees of vague, ambiguous, 
and non-responsive certifications, we see no need to comment 
in this case on the narrow category of certifications deemed 
negative.  
 
 Lehigh Valley’s additional arguments in support of a 
negative certification are unavailing. It emphasizes that the 
                                              
5 Lehigh Valley maintains that Hansler waived her argument 
concerning a distinction between the length of the requested 
leave and the expected duration of her condition by not 
raising it before the District Court. See Brennan v. Norton, 
350 F.3d 399, 415 n.12 (3d Cir. 2003). We disagree. 
Although Hansler did not mention this nuance in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2613(b), she did argue generally, with a supporting case and 
citations to regulations, that her certification was insufficient 
and that Lehigh Valley should have given her a chance to 
cure. Accordingly, Hansler has preserved the issue for appeal. 
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Medical Leave Act is not a forward-looking statute and “does 
not require an employer to be clairvoyant.” Lichtenstein v. 
Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 
2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
According to Lehigh Valley, the short duration of Hansler’s 
symptoms prior to her leave request provided no basis for it to 
know that Hansler was suffering from a prolonged and 
chronic illness. This argument would carry more force if the 
issue at stake was notice. See Ross, 755 F.3d at 191-92 
(explaining that to state a claim for interference, a plaintiff 
must give notice to the defendant of his or her intention to 
take leave). But no one disputes notice; Hansler provided 
Lehigh Valley with a certification specifically requesting 
leave under the Act. Thus, nothing in this opinion burdens 
employers with the troublesome task of predicting, on their 
own, the nature and trajectory of their employees’ illnesses. 
The relevant question here is not whether Lehigh Valley 
could have known Hansler was suffering from a chronic 
condition at the time she requested leave; instead, it is 
whether the certification was insufficient and/or incomplete. 
Receipt of an insufficient or incomplete certification triggers 
certain regulatory obligations on an employer that are 
unrelated to its understanding of the employee’s health 
condition.  
 
 Similarly, Lehigh Valley maintains that Hansler’s 
post-termination diagnoses of diabetes and high blood 
pressure foreclose her ability to establish that she had a 
chronic serious health condition at the time she requested 
leave. See Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 96 (1st Cir. 
2001) (explaining that operative time for determining whether 
a particular condition qualifies as a serious health condition is 
the time that leave is requested or taken). Again, this misses 
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the point. That Hansler was diagnosed with her illnesses after 
she was fired does not affect the determination of whether her 
medical certification was insufficient. 
 
 Having concluded that Hansler plausibly alleges her 
certification was insufficient rather than negative, the next 
question is whether she states a claim for interference under 
the Act. Upon receipt of her insufficient certification, Lehigh 
Valley was required to (1) advise Hansler that her 
certification was insufficient, (2) state in writing what 
additional information was necessary to make it sufficient, 
and (3) provide her with an opportunity to cure before 
denying her request for leave. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c). 
Lehigh Valley ignored these requirements and, instead, 
terminated Hansler without first notifying her that the request 
for leave had been denied. Hansler may premise her 
interference claim on these alleged regulatory violations. 
 
 Though our Court has not yet ruled on this issue, 
several district courts in this circuit have found interference 
claims following an employer’s breach of its obligations 
under § 825.305.6 The few relevant decisions from the Courts 
                                              
6 See Patel v. Saint Vincent Health Ctr., No. 12-298, 2015 
WL 630260, at *13 (W.D. Pa., Feb. 12, 2015) (“[Employer] 
interfered with Plaintiff’s FMLA rights by not informing her 
that the certification submitted by [the physician] was 
incomplete and insufficient.”); Herco v. Se. Pa. Transp. 
Auth., No. 10-796, 2011 WL 294493, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 
2011) (finding interference claim based on employee’s 
submission of an incomplete medical certification and 
employer’s failure to request additional information); 
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of Appeals suggest that employees who allege harm arising 
from the employers’ failure to provide a cure period may 
assert a cause of action for interference. See Kauffman, 426 
F.3d at 886-87; Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 
903, 910 (7th Cir. 2008); Sorrell v. Rinker Materials Corp., 
395 F.3d 332, 337 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 
 Moreover, we find support for an interference claim 
based on this Court’s precedent concerning notice 
interference. In Conoshenti v. Public Service Electric & Gas 
Co., the plaintiff’s claim was based on his employer failing to 
advise him of his substantive rights under the Act in violation 
of regulatory requirements.7 364 F.3d 135, 142 (3d Cir. 
2004). The plaintiff there insisted that, if he had received the 
necessary information, “he would have been able to make an 
informed decision about structuring his leave and would have 
structured it, and his plan of recovery, in such a way as to 
preserve the job protection afforded by the Act.” Id. at 142-
                                                                                                     
Marrero v. Camden Cnty. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 164 F. Supp. 2d 
455, 466 (D.N.J. 2001) (“[T]ermination is not an appropriate 
response for an inadequate certification. [The regulations] 
provide[] that where an employer finds a certification 
incomplete, it must give the employee a reasonable 
opportunity to cure any deficiencies.”). 
7 The regulations contain a number of provisions requiring 
employers to provide employees with notice of their rights 
and obligations. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 825.300. For 
example, an employer covered by the Act must include a 
notice in its employee handbooks explaining benefits and 
leave rights. Id. § 825.300(a)(3). 
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43. We held this was a viable theory of recovery, explaining 
that the plaintiff “will show an interference with his right to 
leave under the FMLA . . . if he is able to establish that this 
failure to advise rendered him unable to exercise that right in 
a meaningful way, thereby causing injury.” Id. at 143. Put 
another way, we found a cause of action for notice 
interference in the event plaintiff was able to show prejudice 
as a result of the violation. Id. at 144; see also Ruder v. 
Pequea Valley Sch. Dist., 790 F. Supp. 2d 377, 394 (E.D. Pa. 
2011) (finding interference claim where the defendant’s 
failure to advise plaintiff of his eligibility to take leave 
“rendered him unable to exercise his rights”); Schaar v. 
Lehigh Valley Health Servs., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 490, 496-
97 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (finding interference claim where plaintiff 
alleged that “had she been informed that FMLA was an 
option for her absence, she would have taken her absence as 
FMLA leave”). 
 
 The logic of Conoshenti naturally extends to an 
employer’s failure to comply with its regulatory obligations 
following receipt of an insufficient or incomplete medical 
certification. Just like employers must advise their employees 
of their rights under the Act, 29 C.F.R. § 825.300, they also 
must advise their employees of deficiencies in their medical 
certifications and provide them with an opportunity to cure, 
id. § 825.305(c). These modest burdens imposed on 
employers help ensure that employees are equipped with at 
least basic information about the Act’s requirements and have 
an opportunity to exercise their rights in a meaningful way. 
And to encourage employer compliance, the regulations 
provide injured employees with a cause of action for 
interference. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b) (“Any violations of 
the Act or of these regulations constitute interfering with, 
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restraining, or denying the exercise of rights provided by the 
Act.”). If we were to find otherwise, employees would be left 
without a remedy. 
 
 Based on the facts alleged in the complaint, we 
conclude that Hansler states a claim for interference under 29 
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). She alleges that, in violation of the 
regulations, Lehigh Valley failed to identify deficiencies in 
her medical certification and failed to provide her with an 
opportunity to cure. Hansler alleges she was prejudiced by 
these failures because, “[h]ad [Lehigh Valley] properly 
requested that [her] physician provide more information to 
show a serious health condition, [her] physician would have 
been [in] a position to provide the full diagnosis of [her] 
chronic health conditions.” App. 45. Instead of having the 
chance to exercise her rights in a meaningful way and 
demonstrate her entitlement to leave, Lehigh Valley fired her. 
As such, Hansler sufficiently alleges she was prejudiced as a 
result of Lehigh Valley’s regulatory violations. Indeed, 
Lehigh Valley does not appear to dispute a finding of 
prejudice, instead focusing its efforts on arguing that Hansler 
was not entitled to a cure period in the first instance—an 
argument we have rejected. Appellee Br. at 8 (“While it may 
be true that, had Hansler been given more time, she would 
have been able to offer additional information, this simply is 
not relevant to whether Hansler was entitled, under the 
FMLA regulations, to a cure period.”).  
 
Not only is our conclusion dictated by precedent as 
well as the statutory and regulatory text, but we believe the 
cure period makes abundant sense in this context. Faced with 
nascent symptoms from a yet-to-be diagnosed condition, an 
employee’s physician may need some additional time to 
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provide the required elements of a sufficient certification, 
including more specific information regarding relevant 
medical facts and the probable duration of the condition, the 
planned medical treatment, and the intermittent leave. 29 
U.S.C. § 2613(b). As this case illustrates, for an employee 
with an emerging condition, the difference between a medical 
certification that supports leave and one that is deficient 
might be a matter of days. 
 
B. 
 
 Hansler’s second claim is that Lehigh Valley 
terminated her in retaliation for seeking leave. Retaliation 
claims arise out of the Medical Leave Act’s prohibition on 
employers “discharg[ing] or in any other manner 
discriminat[ing] against any individual for opposing any 
practice made unlawful.” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2); see 29 
C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (prohibiting employers from 
“discriminating or retaliating against an employee or 
prospective employee for having exercised or attempt[ing] to 
exercise FMLA rights”). To state such a claim, Hansler must 
allege (1) she invoked her right to leave, (2) she suffered an 
adverse employment decision, and (3) the adverse action was 
causally related to her invocation of rights. See Lichtenstein, 
691 F.3d at 301-02.  
 
 The District Court dismissed Hansler’s retaliation 
claim, finding she did not make a “valid” request for leave. 
This conclusion flowed from our holding that “firing an 
employee for a valid request for FMLA leave may constitute 
interference with the employee’s FMLA rights as well as 
retaliation against the employee.” Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. 
Co., 582 F.3d 500, 509 (3d Cir. 2009). The District Court 
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reasoned that because her leave request was “premised upon 
the existence of a serious chronic health condition and her 
medical certification was a negative certification with respect 
to such a condition, [Hansler’s] leave request was not a valid 
request entitling her to FMLA leave and, accordingly, may 
not form the basis for an FMLA retaliation claim.” Hansler, 
2014 WL 1281132, at *13.  
 As we disagree with the underpinnings of this 
conclusion—i.e., the certification was negative and Hansler 
was not entitled to benefits under the Act—we hold that 
Hansler’s claim should not be dismissed at this stage. Hansler 
alleges she attempted to invoke her right to leave, she was not 
advised of deficiencies in her medical certification, she was 
not provided a cure period, and she was fired a few weeks 
later as a result of her leave request. Through discovery, 
Hansler might be able to show that Lehigh Valley had a 
retaliatory motive and that the stated reason for termination 
was pretextual. See Lupyan v. Corinthian Colls. Inc., 761 
F.3d 314, 325-26 (3d Cir. 2014); Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 
309-10. 
 
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the 
District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
1 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
 The majority fashions a new rule to fit a sad case.  In 
early April of 2013, Deborah Hansler was diagnosed with 
diabetes and high blood pressure.  Had these conditions been 
diagnosed just days earlier when Hansler applied for FMLA 
leave, she would have been entitled to medical leave under 
the Family and Medical Leave Act1—ensuring her time to 
treat her illness and a position upon her return.  Instead, 
Hansler was denied leave and terminated from her job at 
Lehigh Valley.  While I too sympathize with Hansler’s 
situation, I cannot subscribe to the majority’s strained re-
interpretation of the FMLA. 
 
When an employer receives a request for FMLA leave, 
the decision on whether to grant that leave depends on the 
factual situation presented to the employer at the time that the 
leave is requested.  The “crucial moment for determining if a 
particular condition qualifies” for FMLA leave “is the time 
that leave is requested or taken.”2  Here, Hansler requested 
“intermittent leave at a frequency of 2 times per week” for 
one month based on her suffering from shortness of breath, 
nausea, and vomiting during the previous two weeks.3  
                                                          
1 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.  
2 Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 96 (1st Cir. 2001); see 
Yansick v. Temple Univ. Health Sys., No. 04-4228, 2006 WL 
2243178, at *13 n.26 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2006) (“[W]e must 
determine whether any medical evidence shows that, at the 
time of Plaintiff’s absence, the specified condition actually 
prevented him from working.”). 
3 See A.44 ¶¶ 6-7.  Notably, at oral argument, Lehigh Valley’s 
counsel stated that Hansler’s doctor described her as suffering 
2 
 
Hansler’s medical certification accurately reflected her 
condition at the time of her request.  This condition did not, 
however, qualify her for FMLA leave.  This is not a case of a 
deficient certification that omitted necessary information.  It 
is simply a case of a certification that describes a condition 
that is not one for which FMLA leave can be awarded. 
 
The reader may respond, “Well, let’s not penalize the 
poor lady for applying too early for leave – for applying 
before her physician had diagnosed diabetes.  Let’s let her 
clear up any short fall in the information she gave her 
employer by permitting her to correct her deficiencies 
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c).”  The problem with this 
solution is that the employer in good faith, with the completed 
form and the information on it, has denied FMLA leave 
because the employee was not qualified for it.  There was no 
indication on the certification of the health care provider that 
one or more of the applicable entries had not been completed 
and there was no information that was vague, ambiguous, or 
non-responsive.  The certificate was not rejected by the 
employer as incomplete or insufficient.  FMLA leave was 
denied because the completed certificate did not present 
grounds to grant FMLA leave.  In this situation, there is no 
statutory right to cure by presenting further information 
within seven days.  The employer here should not be 
penalized for denying leave when the complete and 
unambiguous request for leave did not present grounds for 
leave. 
                                                                                                                                  
from “cold symptoms.”  See Oral Arg. at 18:10-20.  Although 
Hansler was later diagnosed with a more serious condition, 
Lehigh Valley had no reason to be aware of this later 
diagnosis when leave was denied. 
3 
 
 
I urge that the employer not be penalized for denying 
the original request for FMLA leave when it was properly 
denied on the face of the request.  If interference with FMLA 
leave can be found in a case like this one, the employer, 
through no fault of its own, can be penalized by being held 
liable for damages (i) in the amount of “wages, salary, 
employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost . . 
. by reason of the violation” or, if not so denied or lost, then 
the amount of “actual monetary losses sustained . . . as a 
direct result of the violation” up to the sum of 12 weeks of 
wages or salary for the employee, (ii) interest, and (iii) 
liquidated damages equal to the amounts in clauses (i) and 
(ii).4  An employee is also entitled to any appropriate 
equitable relief such as “employment, reinstatement, and 
promotion,”5 and “reasonable attorney’s fee, reasonable 
expert witness fees, and other costs of the action.”6  Hansler is 
attempting to take full advantage of these remedies by 
seeking “lost pay, lost bonuses, lost benefits, other financial 
losses, liquidated damages, . . . attorneys fees, costs, interest, 
reinstatement of employment, and any other [fair and proper] 
relief.”7     
 
The majority goes to great lengths to conclude that 
Hansler was entitled to time to cure any deficiencies in her 
medical certification and that Lehigh Valley’s failure to 
provide that opportunity may form the basis of an interference 
                                                          
4 See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). 
5 See id. § 2617(a)(1)(B).  
6 See id. § 2617(a)(3). 
7 Hansler also seeks damages for pain and suffering and 
punitive damages, but neither is authorized under the statute. 
4 
 
claim.  Yet nowhere does the opinion address whether 
Hansler was actually entitled to FMLA leave.  Curiously, the 
majority assumes that the information provided in Hansler’s 
certification did not satisfy the FMLA’s requirements.8  There 
can be no interference, however, if Hansler was not entitled to 
leave in the first place.9 
 
While Hansler’s physician may have needed additional 
time to diagnose her condition as diabetes, nothing in the 
FMLA provides for such a grace period.  Admittedly, the 
FMLA requires that employers provide employees with seven 
calendar days to cure deficiencies in their medical 
certifications.10  The purpose of this provision, however, is to 
clarify the information provided in a certification, not to 
provide time to discover a yet-to-be diagnosed condition.11   
                                                          
8 See Maj. Op. at 8 n.3. 
9 See Sommer v. Vanguard Grp., 461 F.3d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 
2006) (“To assert an interference claim, ‘the employee . . . 
needs to show that [s]he was entitled to benefits under the 
FMLA and that [s]he was denied them.’” (quoting Callison v. 
City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2005))); accord 
Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903, 910 (7th Cir. 
2008) (“Because [plaintiff] cannot demonstrate that he was 
actually entitled to FMLA leave, [the employer’s] breach of 
its duty to offer him an opportunity to cure deficiencies 
caused him no harm, and he may not recover for that breach 
under the FMLA.”). 
10 See 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c). 
11 See 73 Fed. Reg. 67934, 68062 (Nov. 17, 2008) 
(“Providing more [cure] time will reduce mistakes and 
provide greater certainty in the workplace, and this typically 
benefits both workers and employers.”); 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 
5 
 
 
 According to the majority, Hansler’s certification was 
“vague, ambiguous, or non-responsive” because it “does not 
even mention a condition, let alone its duration.”12  The 
majority, however, reads into the Second Amended 
Complaint facts that Hansler never alleged.  Hansler merely 
alleged that her physician requested intermittent leave 
“lasting for a probable duration of one-month or until about 
April 1, 2013.”13  She does not allege that her physician 
omitted her then-condition or its duration.14  Even construing 
the complaint in the light most favorable to Hansler, she still 
must allege facts suggesting that her certification was 
incomplete, vague, ambiguous, or non-responsive.  She did 
not.   
 
 Ultimately, the issue is who bears the burden when an 
employee has an undiagnosed condition.  The majority tasks 
employers with this novel burden, deeming it irrelevant 
“whether Lehigh Valley could have known Hansler was 
suffering from a chronic condition at the time she requested 
                                                                                                                                  
2258 (Jan. 6, 1995) (“The employer shall advise an employee 
whenever the employer finds a certification incomplete, and 
provide the employee a reasonable opportunity to cure any 
such deficiency.”). 
12 See Maj. Op. at 11-12.   
13 See A.44 ¶ 7.  
14 In fact, she never even argued before the District Court that 
her physician omitted the duration or condition in the 
certification; rather, she claimed that her certification was 
“insufficient” because her future diagnosis was not yet 
known.  See S.A. 25-27. 
6 
 
leave.”15  This construction is not tethered to the statute’s 
text, which places the burden on employees to demonstrate 
that they qualify for leave and permits employers to require 
that a leave request be supported by a medical certification.  
The majority’s conclusion that employers may not then 
reasonably rely on that information makes little sense.  I 
would hold that where, as here, an employer has no basis for 
concluding that an employee has a current, serious health 
condition under the FMLA, it may deny the leave request.  
Such a denial is not interference.  
 
Going forward under the Majority’s rule, you will now 
be able to maintain an interference claim against your 
employer regardless of your condition when you request 
leave if you claim that your diagnosis changed or was not 
finalized until after you submitted the request.  This is true for 
even the most frivolous leave requests.  Indeed, following the 
Majority, as long as the “certification does not contain a 
statement from [your] physician saying that [you] would not 
miss any work,” the employer who denies a leave request is at 
risk of an interference claim.16  For lawyers seeking 
attorneys’ fees under the FMLA,17 this message will sound 
loud and clear. 
                                                          
15 See Maj. Op. at 12.  
16 See Maj. Op. at 10.  
17 See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3). 
